Autor/es
Descripción
ver mas
Colaborador
Plot, Martín
Idioma
spa
Extent
226 p.
Derechos
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.0 Genérica (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
Formato
application/pdf
Identificador
Abstract
The concept of responsibility is central to the work by Hannah Arendt. The acuteness of her analysis and judgment in dealing with its problematic meaning is particularly valuable in the hermeneutics of the events of the time and also of the subsequent years till our present days, as it is key in the understanding and a central issue in the sphere of human affairs. The aim of this work is to understand the problematic meaning of the concept of responsibility with basis on the incidence that the variations in perspective and emphasis in different moments of the thought of Hannah Arendt bear on the concept, as regards action, thought, will and judgment. In this sense, the question-problem of this thesis could be formulated as follows: In which way does Hannah Arendt understand the problematic concept of responsibility along the different moments of her thought?
The postulated hypothesis supports the idea that for Hannah Arendt responsibility is unavoidable, inalienable, complex and paradoxical. These constant characteristics are marked through by the tensions, the perspectives and the emphasis of the political, personal, moral and juridical meanings of responsibility that characterize the different moments of her thought. The main studies of arendtian thought coincide on the idea that the Eichmann process and the ulterior publishing of the reflections on what took place along the trial constitute a turning point in her thought. Villa supports that towards the late 60s and the early 70s, Arendt goes from emphasizing the basic characteristics of active life to focusing on the importance of thought, will and judgment in the active life of the mind, a turn incompletely reflected in The Life of the Mind. It is a change of perspective that has implications in the understanding of the meaning of responsibility and that justifies research with an all encompassing, comparative and integrative view of the different moments of Arendt’s work as proposed by this project. The current research on the topic focuses on a particular period or aspect of responsibility. The present thesis aims at differentiating from the partial interpretations and at arguing with them. The original contribution of the thesis will reside in the integral analysis of the problem of responsibility, and of the paradoxes, the changes in emphasis and stress that the different moments in the work of Arendt present. The current exploration will highlight the articulations and tensions of the problem of responsibility present in the works prior and posterior to Eichmann in Jerusalem. The research carried out in the Master’s Thesis dealt with the link between responsibility and action in The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition and other works prior to Eichmann in Jerusalem. The present doctoral thesis will amplify and deepen the research theme along all the stages of arendtian work, and, with base on the conclusions previously formulated, it will particularly explore the incidence of the image of a non coherent interior self but a multiple one, constituted by three differentiated and confronted faculties (thought, will and judgment) in the understanding of the meaning of responsibility. The analysis will nevertheless not be historiographic, but rather a relational exegesis that will set these works in dialogue in order to identify the moments of appearance, tension and mutation of the arendtian concept of responsibility. The guiding criterion of the division of the chapters does not correspond to the four works that constitute the central corpus of the exploration. It rather responds to the identification of problems than to the unidirectional exegesis of each of the chosen works. This modality enables the tangential use of other arendtian texts as long as they contribute to the understanding of the problem that this thesis aims at unravelling.
The postulated hypothesis supports the idea that for Hannah Arendt responsibility is unavoidable, inalienable, complex and paradoxical. These constant characteristics are marked through by the tensions, the perspectives and the emphasis of the political, personal, moral and juridical meanings of responsibility that characterize the different moments of her thought. The main studies of arendtian thought coincide on the idea that the Eichmann process and the ulterior publishing of the reflections on what took place along the trial constitute a turning point in her thought. Villa supports that towards the late 60s and the early 70s, Arendt goes from emphasizing the basic characteristics of active life to focusing on the importance of thought, will and judgment in the active life of the mind, a turn incompletely reflected in The Life of the Mind. It is a change of perspective that has implications in the understanding of the meaning of responsibility and that justifies research with an all encompassing, comparative and integrative view of the different moments of Arendt’s work as proposed by this project. The current research on the topic focuses on a particular period or aspect of responsibility. The present thesis aims at differentiating from the partial interpretations and at arguing with them. The original contribution of the thesis will reside in the integral analysis of the problem of responsibility, and of the paradoxes, the changes in emphasis and stress that the different moments in the work of Arendt present. The current exploration will highlight the articulations and tensions of the problem of responsibility present in the works prior and posterior to Eichmann in Jerusalem. The research carried out in the Master’s Thesis dealt with the link between responsibility and action in The Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition and other works prior to Eichmann in Jerusalem. The present doctoral thesis will amplify and deepen the research theme along all the stages of arendtian work, and, with base on the conclusions previously formulated, it will particularly explore the incidence of the image of a non coherent interior self but a multiple one, constituted by three differentiated and confronted faculties (thought, will and judgment) in the understanding of the meaning of responsibility. The analysis will nevertheless not be historiographic, but rather a relational exegesis that will set these works in dialogue in order to identify the moments of appearance, tension and mutation of the arendtian concept of responsibility. The guiding criterion of the division of the chapters does not correspond to the four works that constitute the central corpus of the exploration. It rather responds to the identification of problems than to the unidirectional exegesis of each of the chosen works. This modality enables the tangential use of other arendtian texts as long as they contribute to the understanding of the problem that this thesis aims at unravelling.
Título obtenido
Doctora de la Universidad de Buenos Aires en Ciencias Sociales
Institución otorgante
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales